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Abstract
This paper analyzes the tax competition and tax exporting e¤ect of …nancial
integration. On the one hand, …nancial integration increases capital mobility and
thus the incentive for countries to compete for capital. On the other hand, …nancial
integration increases foreign ownership of …rms and capital and allows for exportation
of source taxes. Both e¤ects have contrary implications for capital taxes. Allowing for
imperfectly mobile capital, our analysis suggests that currently the tax exportation
e¤ect is dominating, which implies excessive capital taxation. From studying the
benchmark of full …nancial integration we …nd that capital taxes are likely to increase
from current levels. We further examine the tax exportation e¤ect empirically and
…nd that is signi…cant as well as quantitatively important for the U.S.
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The dramatic rise in international capital ‡ows in recent years has caused an extensive
debate in both academic and policy circles about the consequences of tax competition.
Tax competition arises because governments have in the presence of internationally mobile
capital an incentive to undercut each others’ capital income taxes in orderto attract capital.
It can lead toa ’race tothebottom’ that resultsin ine¢ciently low taxes on capital. Spurred
by the observed decline in capital taxes over the last two decades, this argument has led to
calls for internationally coordinated rises in capital tax rates (for example Tanzi, 1999, and
the Ruding and the Primarolo report for tax coordination in the European Union, 1992
and 1999).
However, despite apparently low frictions to international capital movements, taxes on
capital income are still rather high. For example, top statutory tax rates average at around
35% for the major industrial countries. This is in contrast to standard tax competition
models that predict low or even zero capital income taxes in the case of perfect capital
mobility (Razin and Sadka, 1991). An explanation for this phenomenon is that ongoing
…nancial integration increases foreign ownership of …rms and capital, which may enable
the government to export source taxes to foreigners. A government faces then lower costs
of taxation (in terms of a reduction in domestic income) and may hence set a higher tax
on capital. Huizinga and Nielsen (1997) have shown that if …rms are partly foreign-owned,
capital taxes serve to shift rents from foreigners to domestic residents. If the government is
not able to fully tax …rms’ pro…ts, optimal capital tax rates do then increase with the degree
of foreign ownership. This tax exporting e¤ect counteracts the e¤ect of tax competition on
capital income taxes. If the tax exporting e¤ect is dominating, …nancial integration can
actually increase taxes. Moreover, the welfare implications of coordinated tax rises may
be reversed. It is therefore an interesting question whether one of the two e¤ects is likely
to outweigh the other.
The main aim of this paper is to explicitly study the relative importance of the tax
exportation and tax competition e¤ect. In contrast to the previous literature we allow
for partly immobile capital and foreign ownership of …rms and capital. The motivation is
that when capital is to some extent foreign-owned and not completely mobile, a second
tax exporting motive arises. The intuition is similar: an increase in foreign ownership of
capital reduces the costs of capital taxes in terms of lower domestic income and gives the
government an incentive to set a higher tax on capital.1 Using empirical estimates for the
tax elasticity of capital mobility, we …nd that for the current situation the immobility of
capital suggests excessive taxation, i.e., the tax exporting e¤ect is dominating. This also
holds if pro…ts can be fully taxed, in this case there is no motive for rent shifting due to
foreign ownership of …rms as emphasized in the literature.
1Notably this e¤ect vanishes if there is completely mobile capital.
1Although a high level of …nancial integration has already been achieved among the
major industrial countries, we are still far away from full …nancial integration. This is
indicated by the relatively low estimates for the tax elasticity of capital but also by the
observed low international diversi…cation.2 In order to get insights about possible future
trends in capital taxation, we also study capital taxes for the benchmark case of full …-
nancial integration. Under full …nancial integration, new investment is completely mobile
internationally. In contrast, relocation (even domestically) of capital that has already been
installed remains costly. This has the consequence that although there is perfect competi-
tion fornew capital, the existing capital stock is partly immobile. Lee (1997) has considered
a two-period model with foreign ownership in which capital that has been invested in the
…rst period is …xed in the second. He …nds that excessive taxation can arise. Our approach
di¤ers from his in that we develop a fully dynamic model with depreciating capital and
endogenous capital formation, which allows to derive quantitative implications. We fur-
thermore characterize full …nancial integration by full foreign ownership. This is consistent
with complete international risk-pooling but also with the sole existence of multinational
…rms. We …nd that in the case of completely ‡exible installed capital, equilibrium capital
income taxes are substantial (41%) under full …nancial integration. If relocating installed
capital is costly, much higher income taxes can arise (larger than 91%). This is true even
for relatively small costs of relocation.
The second aim of the paper is to examine the tax exporting e¤ect due to foreign
ownership empirically. Using yearly panel data from 1977to 1998, we estimate the in‡uence
of foreign ownership in the U.S. (on the state level) on state corporate taxes. Both of our
measures of foreign ownership turn out to be signi…cant. The estimated parameters imply
that the increase in foreign ownership during the sample period has led to an increase in
the corporate tax burden by 5 ¡ 17%. Our results also suggest that given the low current
extent of foreign ownership (which indicates a high potential for increases in cross-border
ownership) the tax exporting e¤ect will be an important determinant of capital taxation
as the world move towards more …nancial integration.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section analyzes public
goods provision in a simple static model with exogenously given foreign ownership share
and capital mobility. The third section studies capital taxes in the steady state under
full …nancial integration. Section 4.4 contains the empirical evidence for the tax exporting
e¤ect. The …nal section concludes.
2A consensus estimate for the tax elasticity of FDI is ¡0:6% (Hines, 1999), which is far less than what
models of full capital mobility imply. International portfolio diversi…cation is around 5 ¡ 20% for major
industrial countries. This also is much lower than what is implied by standard portfolio models (which
suggest near 100% foreign ownership share for a small country).
22 Public Good Provision with Foreign Ownership
Consider a small economy with a representative household that is endowed with a …xed
amount of capital k. The degree of cross-ownership is ¹, meaning that a share ¹ of the
domestic …rm and the capital k employed in the domestic …rm are held by foreigners.3 The
part of the capital stock k that is not invested at home is invested at the world interest
rate r. The production of the …rm is f(k). The government can only raise a source tax on
capital in order to …nance the public good. In equilibrium, the after-tax return on domestic
capital equals the world interest rate: f0 ¡ ¿ = r. The consumer’s and the government’s
budget equations are
c = (1 ¡¹)[f ¡ f
0k] + (1 ¡¹)(f
0 ¡ ¿)k + r(k ¡ (1 ¡ ¹)k)
= (1 ¡¹)[f ¡ ¿k ¡ rk] + rk (1)
g = ¿k (2)
where c and g are private and public consumption, respectively. The government maximizes
the utility of the representative household u(c) + v(g), subject to (1) and (2) and taking r
as given. Compared to a closed economy without foreign ownership, the optimal taxation
problem changes as follows. First, an increase in the tax rate leads to capital ‡ight (since
@k=@¿ = k0 < 0), which erodes the tax base and reduces the incentives for taxation (tax
competition e¤ect). Second, since a share ¹ of the production of the country goes to
foreigners, the costs of additional taxation in terms of a reduction in the representative
household’s income are reduced (tax exporting e¤ect).
Proposition 1 The equilibrium marginal rate of substitution (MRS) between public and
private good in the absence of a pro…t tax is given by
MRS = (1 ¡ ¹)=(1 + ") (3)
where " = k0 ¢ (¿=k) is the tax elasticity of capital.
Proof. From the government’s FOC u0@c=@¿ + v0@g=@¿ = 0 we have MRS = v0=u0 =
(¡@c=@¿)=(@g=@¿). The proposition follows with @c=@¿ = (1 ¡ ¹)[f0k0 ¡ k ¡ ¿k0 ¡ rk0] =
¡(1 ¡ ¹)k (using r = f0 ¡ ¿) and @g=@¿ = k + ¿k0.
Proposition 1 illustrates the two e¤ects of …nancial integration on public good provision.
First, …nancial integration increases capital mobility (j"j rises) and hence the incentives for
cutting taxes. This leads to less provision of the public good (the MRS rises). Second,
by reducing the costs of international diversi…cation, …nancial integration increases the
3There are two reasons why we consider cross-ownership of capital and …rms. First, if both pro…ts and
capital income are risky, optimal diversi…cation requires cross-ownership in both. Second, it is in practice
di¢cult to separate between both types of income. Ownership claims have therefore typically a pro…t and
a capital income component.
3degree of cross-ownership ¹, which will increase the public good provision (the MRS falls).
Alternatively, the increase in cross-ownership can also be brought about by an increasing
importance of MNE’s due to …nancial integration (MNE’s create cross-ownership because
they invest in di¤erent countries and typically have a multinational shareholder base).
According to proposition 1, there is overprovision of the public good if ¹ > j"j. Hines
(1999) reports a consensus tax elasticity of ¡0:6 for the investment between the U.S. and
the rest of the world (in both directions). This foreign direct investment elasticity is de…ned
as "FDI = @FDI=@¿¢(¿=FDI), where FDI refers to the FDI-position in the country under
consideration. With FDI = ¹k and @FDI=@¿ = k0 4 it follows that "FDI = "=¹. The
condition for overprovision of the public good becomes j"FDIj < 1, which is independent
of ¹. The intuition for the latter is that an increase in ¹ will increase the tax exporting
e¤ect but also " (because the tax sensitive FDI rises as a share of total capital). Both
e¤ects are canceling out. Hines’s elasticity thus suggests overprovision of the public good
(and thus excessive taxation).5;6
This result may be sensitive to the assumption that pro…ts cannot be taxed and hence
there is no cost of capital ‡ight in terms of reduced pro…t tax income. If there is no
alternative source for government revenues, income taxes are not even zero in the standard
case of no foreign ownership and full capital mobility. If we assume to the contrary that
the government fully taxes pro…ts, the motive for taxing capital in order to extract pro…t
rents from foreigners (as in Huizinga and Nielsen, 1997) is absent. Consequently, there will
be less provision of the public good.7
Proposition 2 In the case of full pro…t taxation, the marginal rate of substitution is
MRS =
(1 ¡ ¹)(1 ¡ f00k0)
1 ¡ f00k0 + "
. (4)
Proof. Private and public good consumption are given by c = (1¡¹)(f0¡¿ ¡r)k+rk
and g = f ¡(f0¡¿)k. With @c=@¿ = (1¡¹)[(f00k0¡1)k+(f0¡¿ ¡r)k0 = (1¡¹)(f00k0¡1)k
and @g=@¿ = (1 ¡ f00k0)k + ¿k0 the proposition follows.
In the case of full capital mobility we have f00k0 = 1 (this is obtained by di¤erentiating
the no-arbitrage condition f0 ¡ ¿ = t with respect to ¿). Then @g=@¿ < 0 for all ¿ and
4This assumes that a change in the capital stock is fully brought about by changes in FDI.
5Some researcher …nd more elastic capital. For example, Gorter and Parikh (2001) estimate an elasticity
of ¡1:3 for the European Union, which would imply a dominating tax competition e¤ect and hence
underprovision of the public good.
6A MRS smaller than one does not necessarily imply ine¢ciency because the government can distribute
excess revenues to the household. However, if one allows for capital formation there will be an ine¢ciently
high distortion in the saving decision due to excessive capital income taxation.
7Alternatively, if due to administrative reasons the government can only tax pro…ts and capital income
at the same rate, public good provision is determined by MRS = (1¡¹)=(1+®") for f = k® (for the proof
see the appendix). The condition for overprovision becomes then ®j"j < 1, which implies higher provision
of the public good compared to Proposition 1 for ® < 1.
4the tax rate will be set to zero (its minimal value). Hence, the standard result from the
tax competition literature that a small open economy should not tax capital (Razin and
Sadka, 1991) carries through for foreign ownership of both …rms and capital. For less than
perfect capital mobility the condition for overprovision is given by: j"FDIj < 1¡f00k0 (from
rearranging 4). Using f = k®, f0 ¡¿ = r and k0 = 1=f00 this condition can be transformed
to j"FDIj < 1¡(1¡®)j"FDIj¹(r+¿)=¿. For Hines’s consensus elasticity of "FDI = ¡0:6, a
degree of cross-ownership of ¹ = 0:2 and a capital share in GDP of ® = 0:3, the condition
implies overprovision of the public good for capital income tax rates of higher than 21%
(for the conversion between capital and capital income tax rates see the appendix). Most
industrial countries have capital income tax rates well above 21% (the average of major
countries is around 37%, see Volkerink and De Haan, 1999), hence the immobility of capital
suggests overprovision of the public good also in the case of complete pro…t taxation.
3 Capital Taxation under Full Financial Integration
A shortcoming of the previous analysis is that it neglects possible dynamic implications
of taxation: a change in the tax rate may have e¤ects on the capital stock beyond the
current period. This will be the case if capital that has already been installed in the
economy is less ‡exible than new investment. The current capital stock will then to a
certain extent depend on the past capital stock. This heterogeneity of capital induces
furthermore an asymmetry in the response of the capital stock to taxes. The relatively
less mobile installed capital creates an incentive for the government to set higher tax rates,
while new capital (investment) provides a tax competition motive.
In the following we will study capital taxation in a fully dynamic model in which a
distinction is made between capital that has already been installed and new capital. We
study the benchmark case of full …nancial integration, which we de…ne by the absence of
any costs to cross-border capital movements. Hence new capital is completely mobile. In
the presence of country-speci…c uncertainty to capital and pro…t income, optimal interna-
tional risk-pooling requires that all households end up only holding shares in the (…ctitious)
world portfolio (both in terms of capital and pro…t income). We again study the case of
a small economy, hence the country’s share in the world portfolio is minuscule. Domestic
households receive then only a negligible part of their income from domestic sources, imply-
ing that domestic …rms and domestically invested capital are e¤ectively held by foreigners
(¹ = 1 in terms of the preceding section’s notation).
Assume that capital depreciates at the rate ± > 0. There is furthermore a proportional
cost ° (0 · ° · 1) of relocating installed capital. This cost is interpreted in a broad
sense. It comprises, among others, installation and transportation costs, the loss of location
speci…c capital (such as investment in immobile human capital) and information costs. All
of these costs are not directly related to cross-border mobility and will therefore remain
5under perfect …nancial integration. There are in…nitely many periods in the model. At the
beginning of each period the government sets the tax rate ¿ on capital taking the world
interest rate as given. After, the domestic (representative) household decides on how
much of its endowment to invest at the world interest rate r and how much to consume,
similarly, foreign investors decide how much capital to invest in the country. Maximization
of returns (by foreign investors) requires that the returns on domestic investment are equal
an investment at the world capital market at rate r as long as the …xedness of installed
capital (° > 0) is not binding.
Households maximize life-time utility by allocating their period endowment between






tu(ct), s.t. ct + (bt ¡ bt¡1) = f(k) ¡ rf(k) + rbt¡1 (5)
where f(k) ¡ rf(k) is their (…xed) foreign pro…t income from the world portfolio. Note
that domestic consumption does not depend on the domestic tax rate. We furthermore
assume (1 + r)¯ = 1, which is consistent with the world economy being in steady state.
It follows from the household’s …rst order condition that bt and ct are constant over time.
Besides the tax ¿ on capital, there is furthermore an exogenously given share À of the …rm’s
pro…ts that are taxed. The tax revenue in period t is then ht = À(f(kt)¡f0(kt)kt)+¿kt =
Àf(kt)+(¿ ¡Àf0(kt))kt. The government maximizes the utility of the domestic household






t(u(ct) + v(gt)), (6)
s.t. gt + bg;t ¡ bg;t¡1 = Àf(kt) + (¿ ¡ Àf
0(kt))kt + rbg;t¡1; where kt = kt(f¿jgj·t)
i.e., the government cannot commit itself and faces a typical time-inconsistency problem: a
tax rate announced in earlier periods may not be optimal later on. bg;t denotes government
saving at the world capital market. kt(f¿jgj·t) is the country’s capital stock after a history
of tax rates f¿jgj·t and is a shortcut for writing kt(f¿e
T;jgj¸t), where ¿e
T;t are investor’s
beliefs at time T about the tax in ¿ and are a function of the entire history of taxes, i.e.,
¿e
T;t = ¿e
T;t(f¿jgj·T) (note that investors’ beliefs are assumed to be homogeneous). Foreign
investors behave atomistically and hence take government actions and the domestic capital


















T;t ¡±) ¸ 1 ¡ ° (8)
Condition (7) states that the present discounted value of the after-tax returnson investment
in domestic capital cannot be larger than one, otherwise investors could increase their
6return by shifting capital from the world capital market into domestic capital. If new
investment takes place in T, i.e., kT > kT¡1(1¡±), then (7) holds with equality. Condition
(8) requires that the after-tax returns have to be at least the value of capital net of costs
° of moving capital.8 Lastly, in order to form an equilibrium, beliefs have to be ful…lled:
¿t = ¿e
s;t for all s;t ¸ 0 and s · t.
We are …rst interested in the equilibrium taxes that would arise in the case of fully
‡exible capital (° = 0). Since the domestic tax does not in‡uence domestic private con-
sumption, the government maximizes
P1
t=T ¯
tv(gt). Because the interest rate corresponds
to the rate of time preference, i.e., (1+ r)¯ = 1, and the government can save and borrow
at r, it will simply maximize the sum of revenues discounted at the rate of time preference
P1
t=T ¯
tht and smooth public expenditure using the world capital market whenever nec-
essary. For ° = 0 we have with equation (8) that equation (7) holds with equality, hence
the no-arbitrage condition f0
t ¡ ¿t ¡ ± = r is ful…lled in each period. The government’s
maximization problem reduces then to maximizing ht = Àf(kt)+(¿ ¡Àf0(kt))kt subject to
f0
t ¡¿t ¡± = r. This is a static problem and we can drop the time subscripts. Throughout
the analysis we furthermore assume that the production function is given by f(k) = k®
Proposition 3 The equilibrium capital tax rate under perfectly mobile capital (° = 0) is
¿
¤ =
(r + d)(1 ¡À)(1 ¡ ®)
1 ¡(1 ¡ À)(1 ¡ ®)
Proof. The government’s FOC is: @h=@¿ = k¡Àf00k0k+¿¤k0 = 0. Di¤erencing the no-
arbitrage condition wrt. ¿ yields f00k0 = 1, substituting for k0 in the FOC and rearranging
gives: ¿¤ = ¡(1¡À)f00k. With f00k = ¡®(1¡®)k®¡1 = ¡(1¡®)f0 = ¡(1¡®)(r+¿¤+±)
the proposition follows.
This transfers into a capital income tax rate of ¿inc = (1¡®)(1¡À) (for the conversion
between capital and capital income tax rates see appendix). The extent of pro…t taxation
À lowers the equilibrium capital income tax rate because an increase in ¿inc reduces the
capital stock and lowers pro…ts (and thus government revenues if À > 0). For À = 1 we
obtain the standard tax competition result of zero taxes on capital. Figure 4.1 shows the
equilibrium capital income tax rates as a function of À for ® = 0:3 (which corresponds to
a capital income share of GDP of 0:3). For the following analysis we assume that, due to
administrative restrictions, the government has to tax pro…ts and capital income at the
same rate in equilibrium. It follows then from ¿inc = (1¡®)(1¡À) = (1¡®)(1¡¿inc) that
¿inc = (1¡®)=(2¡®).9 The equilibrium tax depends on ® (which is positively related to the
8Condition (8) suggests that for portfolio investment the parameter ° is one. This is because even so
investors may trade shares among themselves, they cannot reduce the amount of capital invested in the
country. Moreover, with e¢cient markets the price of an asset will equal its present discounted after-tax
returns, hence an investor has never an incentive to sell an asset.
9Note that with this de…nition the government does not take into account that if it raises ¿ the pro…t
tax À increases as well. If this were the case, the incentive to tax were higher.
7return elasticity of capital, @k=@f0=(k=f0) = (1=f00)=(k=f0) = 1=(1 ¡ ®)) in the usual way:
a lower ® reduces the sensitivity of the capital stock with respect to taxes. This reduces
the costs of taxation in terms of a lower tax base, which, in turn, leads to higher taxes.
Figure 4.2(a) depicts ¿inc as a function of ® for ¿inc = À. For ® = 0:3 we get ¿inc = 41%,
which is a bit above current average e¤ective tax ratios (about 35% for major industrial
countries, Volkerink and de Haan, 1999 and Devereux, Gri¢th and Klemm, 2001).
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Figure 4.1: (Minimum) capital income tax ¿inc and extent of pro…t taxation À
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Figure 4.2 (a)-(d): Sensitivity of the (minimum) capital income tax ¿inc
8Next, we derive minimum requirements on tax rates that have to prevail in an equilib-
rium with ° > 0 such that the government has no incentive to exploit the immobility of
the existing capital by raising the tax rate.10 An exploitation of existing capital is given if
equation (7) is not binding. The minimum taxes can thus be interpreted as the restriction
on equilibrium tax rates imposed by the …xedness of installed capital. We consider two
di¤erent equilibria called no punishment and full punishment equilibrium, respectively.
These equilibria are obtained by restricting investors’ beliefs about future taxes after the
government has deviated from the equilibrium tax (o¤-equilibrium beliefs). In the no pun-
ishment case, a deviation does not have any implications for investors’ beliefs about future
taxation: we assume that whatever tax rate the government sets in the current period,
investors expect the government to return to the equilibrium tax in the next period. In
the full punishment equilibrium, investors believe that the government will completely tax
away future returns after a deviation from the equilibrium. The motivation for picking
these equilibria is the following. By having no dynamic implications at all (the no punish-
ment case), deviations from the equilibrium are made most attractive and require a high
minimum equilibrium tax. On the other hand, choosing strong consequences of deviations
(full punishment) gives low incentives for the government to deviate and results in a low
minium tax. Comparison of both equilibria gives us then information about the sensitivity
of the minimum tax rates with respect to investor’s beliefs.
No Punishment Case. Consider an equilibrium with tax rate ¿¤ and capital stock k¤.
We restrict us to deviations from ¿¤ that last only one period. Let a deviation from the
equilibrium tax rate in the current period be ¿ (¿ 6= ¿¤) with the new capital stock k.
Since beliefs are not history dependent the capital stock k¤ is again achieved in the next
period (after the government sets the tax rate back to ¿¤). This means that one has to
consider only the change in tax revenues in the current period in order to decide whether
a deviation is worthwhile. We only consider increases in the tax rate su¢ciently high such
that no new investment takes place (otherwise equation 7 holds with equality and the
…xedness of installed capital is not binding). For the same reason deviations should not
result in capital leaving the country.11 With the capital stock in the deviation period then
being k = k¤(1 ¡ ±), the latter restriction writes
f
0(k
¤(1 ¡ ±)) ¡ ¿ ¡± + 1 ¸ (1 ¡ °)(1 + r) (9)
Equation (9) ensures that an investor cannot achieve a higher return by moving capital
out of the country and investing it at the world interest rate. In order for ¿¤ to constitute
10A complete characterization of the equilibria is beyond the scope of the chapter and is given the
multiplicity of equilibria not particularly instructive.
11Consider to the contrary that the government deviates with a tax rate ¿ su¢ciently high that capital
leaves the country. The new no-arbitrage condition writes then f0¡¿¡±+1 = (1¡°)(1+r). Di¤erentiating
with respect to ¿ gives the same restriction (k0 = 1=f00) as in the ‡exible case. Since @h=@¿ = ¿k0 + k ¡
Àf00k0k = ¿k0 +(1¡À)k and k < k¤, ¿ > ¿¤ and k
0
= k¤0 < 0, it follows that such a deviation can only be
worthwhile if ¿¤ is not optimal in the ‡exible case (i.e. h0(¿¤) > 0).
9an equilibrium, the deviation to ¿ should not result in higher revenue in the period
Àf(k
¤(1 ¡±)) ¡ (¿ ¡ Àf
0(k
¤(1 ¡±))k






Proposition 4 In the no punishment case, the minimum tax is
¿
¤ =
(r + ±)© + (1 ¡ ±)2 ¡ (1 ¡ °)(1 + r)(1 ¡ ±)
1 ¡ ©
,
where © := (1 ¡±)
a(À=® ¡ À + 1) ¡ À=® + v
Proof. For the most pro…table deviation, (9) will hold with equality. Solving (9) for ¿,
inserting in (10) yields ¿¤ ¸ f0(k¤)©+(1¡±)2¡(1¡°)(1+r)(1¡±). Using f0(k¤) = r+¿¤+±
and solving again for ¿¤ gives the proposition.
For the parameters ® = 0:3, a real interest rate of r = 0:05 (which corresponds to a
discount rate ¯ = 1=(1 + r) ¼ 0:95), a rate of depreciation of ± = 0:07 and proportional
costs ° of relocating installed capital of 15%, Figure 4.1 present the minimum capital
income tax rates as a function of À. ¿inc is relative insensitive to the extent of pro…t
taxation; for À = 0 and À = 1 we get ¿inc = 98% and ¿inc = 94%, respectively. If the pro…t
tax rate is restricted to be ¿inc then ¿inc = 95%. Figure 4.2(a)-(d) depicts the sensitivity
of ¿inc (for ¿inc = À) for the various parameters. It can be seen that the capital income
tax rate is relative insensitive to plausible variations in ®, the discount factor ¯ and the
rate of depreciation ± and stays well above the equilibrium tax rate from the ‡exible case
(41% from proposition 3). The intuition for the relation between the minimum tax and
these parameters is as follows. An increase in ® increases the sensitivity of the capital
stock to taxes (as in proposition 3) and reduces minimum taxes. The in‡uence of ¯ comes
through the relation between ¯ and the interest rate. An increase in ¯ reduces the steady-
state interest rate r, which ceteris paribus increases the equilibrium marginal productivity
of capital f0. Both changes in r and f0 a¤ect the no-capital-‡ight and the no-deviation-
condition (equation 9 and 10) and lead for our parameter values to an increase in the
minimum tax rate. Finally, an increase in ± directly reduces the incentives to deviate from
an equilibrium by increasing the depreciation of the capital stock (and hence the tax base).
From Figure 4.2(c) it can be seen that the minimum tax rate becomes sensitive to °
for values of ° smaller than 5 ¡ 10%. However, it only falls below the equilibrium income
tax rate for ‡exible capital if ° < 0:05% (for ° = 0: ¿inc ¼ 40%). Hence, the …xedness
of capital is always binding (relative to the ‡exible capital case) for plausible parameter
values. Moreover, very high capital income tax rates are implied (larger than 90%) if the
costs of relocating installed capital are not too small (i.e., larger than 7%). The intuition
for the relation between ° and the minimum tax is straightforward: an increase in the costs
of relocating capital increases the maximum tax for which the no-capital-‡ight-condition
(equation 9) is still ful…lled and thus makes deviations more attractive.
10Full Punishment Case. According to investors’ beliefs in the full punishment case, the
government will fully tax future returns after a deviation from ¿¤. Hence, for ° > 0 it is
always bene…cial for investors to shift the complete capital stock abroad in the next period.
Taking into account that the capital stock in the periods after a deviation will then be zero,
the government will set the deviation tax ¿ to maximally exploit the existing capital stock
(= k¤(1 ¡ ±)) in the current period. The restriction the government faces in doing so is
that the after tax return on capital plus the value of capital shifted abroad in the next
period has to be at least the value of capital shifted abroad now and invested at the world
interest rate (no-capital-‡ight condition). This restriction writes
[f
0(k
¤(1 ¡ ±)) ¡ ¿ + (1 ¡°)(1 ¡±)](1 ¡±)k
¤ ¸ (1 ¡ °)(1 + r)(1 ¡ ±)k
¤ for all T ¸ 0 (11)
The condition for the non-pro…tability of deviations from the equilibrium is
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Proposition 5 In the full punishment case, the minimum tax is given by
¿
¤ =
(r + ±)£ ¡ (1 ¡ ¯)(1 ¡ °)(r ¡ ±)(1 ¡ ±)
1 ¡£
,
where £ := (1 ¡ ±)
®(1 ¡ ¯)(À=® ¡ À + 1) ¡ À=® + À
Proof. Again, for the most pro…table deviation, (11) will hold with equality. Using
(11) to substitute ¿ in (12) and applying f0(k¤) = r + ¿¤ + ± one obtains the proposition.
With the parametersfromabove, ¿inc = 5% forÀ = 0 and ¿inc = 2% for À = ¿inc (Figure
4.1). This values are way below the equilibrium tax in the ‡exible case (41%). This is
also true for all the variations in parameters considered above for the no-punishment case
(under ¿inc = À): the minimum tax rate never exceed 3%. Hence, if one assumes that
the equilibrium tax for ° > 0 does not fall below the equilibrium tax for the ‡exible case,
the …xedness of installed capital is not binding. Together with the results from the no
punishment case, our results then suggest that …nancial integration will ultimately not
decrease capital taxes compared to current levels. Depending on equilibrium selection, the
level of capital taxes may even rise drastically.
4 Empirical Evidence on the Tax Exportation E¤ect
In the following we want to study whether an increase in foreign ownership is associated
with higher corporate taxes. The preceding analysis focused thereby on capital income
taxation. Propositions (1) and (2) predict that a higher share of foreign ownership of
both …rms and capital (¹) increases the equilibrium capital income tax rate. However,
11for pro…t taxes are the incentives for taxation equally increased in the presence of foreign
ownership. To see this start from the assumptions of proposition (1) and moreover assume
that the government has a pure pro…t tax ¿¼ available. A marginal increase in the pro…t
tax decreases domestic private income by (1¡¹)¼ and increases tax revenues by ¼ (where
¼ is the domestic …rm’s pro…t). For the equilibrium pro…t tax we have then MRS =
¡(@c=@¿¼)=(@g=@¿¼) = 1 ¡ ¹, which is decreasing in ¹.12 Since it is in empirical work
di¢cult to separate between pure pro…ts and capital income, we focus on the e¤ect of
foreign ownership on the tax rate on the income of corporations and interpret this tax rate
¿ as applying to pro…ts and capital income.13 This is also consistent with our empirical
measures of foreign ownership, which proxy claims to both capital income and pro…ts.
There are several di¢culties involved in estimating a relationship between ¹ and ¿.
One arises because omitted factors (for the explanation of corporate taxes) are possibly
correlated with foreign ownership. In particular, an increase in capital mobility (which
is di¢cult to proxy) lowers taxes through an increased tax base e¤ect but also a¤ects
¹ because of lower costs of diversi…cation. A time series regression is therefore likely to
understate (or even reverse) the in‡uence of ¹ on ¿ if capital mobility increases over time.
Moreover, there are likely to be important country-speci…c e¤ects. For example, capital
mobility may di¤er substantially among countries. It is also known from the literature
of optimal taxation that large countries will set higher taxes, this biases the results in a
cross-section analysis if country sizes are correlated with foreign ownership shares.
To adequately deal with these issues, we run a panel study. Instead of looking at
variations across countries, we study U.S. states. Like countries, these states have general
autonomy with respect to their corporate taxation. Analogous to the government of a
country, a state government that cares about its residents faces lower costs of taxation if
there is investment from outside the state. Choosing the U.S. has (despite the excellent
availability of data) the advantage that although capital mobility varies over time, it is fair
to assume that at a given point of time the capital mobility for each state is the same. We
can then treat changes in capital mobility as a common time-speci…c e¤ect.
An additional complication arises from simultaneity. This is because tax rates in‡uence
the level of capital and pro…t activities in the country. To the extent that there is a
heterogeneous response by foreign and domestic owners, there will be a reverse causality
from ¿ to ¹. If for example foreign investment is more sensitive (as usually assumed) an
increase in ¿ will lower foreign ownership ¹ and the in‡uence of ¹ on ¿ will not be identi…ed
in the regression of ¿ on ¹. It is therefore necessary to test for a causal e¤ect of foreign
ownership on taxes.
12There are no tax base e¤ects since …rms are assumed to be immobile.
13As noted above in Section 4.2, MRS = (1¡¹)=(1+®") in the presence of combined pro…t and income
tax, hence ¿ raises with ¹.
124.1 Data
The Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) conducts yearly surveys of foreign a¢liates in
the U.S., part of these data are on the state level. A foreign a¢liate is a company which
is to more than 10% foreign owned. A widely used measure for foreign investment (as a
stock variable) is PPE, the book value of real productive assets of foreign-owned a¢liates.
It di¤ers from FDI in two important respects. First, it does not include pure …nancial
investment such as debt …nancing. Second, it does not correct for partial foreign ownership
of a corporation. Consistent with our theory, PPE measures both ownership of capital and
pro…ts: acquisition of a …rm by a foreigner will increase PPE as an increase in the capital
stock of a foreign a¢liate will do. Besides PPE we use as a second proxy of foreign
ownership the share of employees that are employed in foreign a¢liates. The latter has the
advantage that it is a better proxy for the tax base (the tax exporting motive is ultimately
determined by the share of the tax base owned by foreigners) in case of human-capital
intensive industries.
A shortcoming of the data is that it measures foreign ownership from outside the U.S.,
i.e., it does not include cross-state ownership (the tax exporting motive depends on the total
ownership share from outside the state). Foreign investment is probably highly correlated
with cross-state investment (on the state level), so the coe¢cient in the regression of ¿ on
foreign ownership will measure the combined e¤ect of foreign ownership and cross-state
ownership.
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Figure 4.3 (a)-(b): Foreign ownership and corporate tax burden, 1977-1998
Our sample runs from 1977 to 1998 (22 years). Figure 4.3(a) shows the development
of the ratio of employment of a¢liates to total employment over time (EmplRatio), which
more than triples during the sample (from roughly 1% to 3.5%). Other measures that are
more closely related to the tax base suggest a somewhat higher in‡uence of a¢liates. The
a¢liates share in total pro…ts was roughly 7% per cent in 1998 (1977: 3%) and federal
corporate income taxes collected from a¢liates totalled at 14% (1977: 6%). In any case,
13there was a signi…cant increase in foreign ownership in the sample period. In the presence
of the tax exporting e¤ect, this should have a¤ected the corporate taxes.
Since we do not exclusively focus on marginal investment decisions, the relevant concept
for measuring the tax burden is the e¤ective average tax rate (EATR). The EATR is
de…ned as the ratio of the tax burden to the pre-tax income. The EATR has been shown
relevant for discrete location decisions (Devereux and Gri¢th, 2001) and thus for pro…t
locations (but has also been used to proxy marginal tax rates, see Swenson, 1994). An
advantage of the relatively simple to compute and robust EATR is furthermore that it
takes into account important aspects of the tax code such as depreciation allowances, tax
base changes and investment credits. A disadvantage is that both pre-tax income and the
tax burden depend on economic activity, which may be related to foreign ownership and
thus create an additional simultaneity.
The literature that studies optimal corporate tax rates in the open economy has almost
exclusively focused on the role of corporate income tax rates. However, corporate income
taxes do only constitute a part of the total tax burden of corporations. As Desai and
Hines (2001) point out, indirect income taxes can in‡uence foreign investment as much
as direct income taxes do. This is particularly true since many countries do not allow
for foreign tax credits for other than corporate income taxes. The by far most important
indirect taxes in the U.S. are the property and the sales tax. To illustrate their e¤ect on
after-tax income, consider the following tax rules. Besides an income tax ¿ (on both pro…t
and capital income), a sales tax ¿s has to be paid on total sales (which are a fraction
s of the …rm’s output f(k)) and a property tax ¿p is levied on all capital invested in
property (assumed to be a share p of total capital). The after tax income is then given by:
[(1¡¿ss)f(k) ¡¿ppk](1 ¡¿). Obviously, all three taxes reduce after-tax income and thus
a¤ect investment decisions. This is also con…rmed by Desai and Hines’s empirical study.
They …nd that indirect taxes have important consequences for the location of pro…ts and
capital. For the estimation, we therefore focus on the total average tax rate for corporations
as de…ned by ratio of the total tax burden (indirect taxes plus corporate income taxes) to
the pre-tax income (but do also report estimations for the corporate income tax rate).14
We compute the tax rates from aggregate data (per state). The corporate income tax
revenues are collected from the Statistical Abstract of the U.S., the indirect business taxes
are from the national account database compiled by the BEA.15 It should be noted that
in principal all taxes apply to foreign and domestic companies equally.16
One may object that due to institutional constraints, the variation in tax rates is too
14A potential shortcoming of having such a broad measure of corporate tax revenue is that the incidence
of indirect taxes is also on private households.
15Indirect business taxes consists to a small part (15%) of federal taxes. We do not correct for this
because federal taxation is the same across states.
16An important condition for the tax exportation e¤ect is that the government does not discriminate
against income earned by foreigners.
14low to be identi…ed in a regression. However, with several tax instruments at hand there
are plenty of possibilities to change the tax burden. Alone the top statutory corporate
income tax rates did change on average 2-3 times per state during the sample period.
Moreover, there were major changes in the income tax base.17 Figure 4.3(b) presents as
a simple measure of the corporate tax burden the corporate income tax revenues as a
share of dividends. One can observe a clear downward trend, which has been commonly
interpreted as (at least partly) the result of tax competition arising from increased capital
mobility. The question is whether this development would have been more pronounced
had the increased capital mobility not lead to an increase in foreign ownership at the same
time.
Our data furthermore consists of a set of national account data (on the state level):
dividends, interest payments, rental income and the compensation for employment (these
variables make roughly up for state income). We also use data on employment, population
and property income (all of the data is from the BEA). Since we use time dummies in our
panel regression, we do not need to include any aggregated (by state) or foreign variables.
We delete from our data set the states without corporate income taxation (Nevada,
South Dakota, Texas, Washington, Wyoming). We exclude Alaska because the reported
corporate income tax revenue varies enormously from year to year and the District of
Columbia, for which some data was not available. This leaves us with 44 states. Table
4.1 presents descriptive statistics for the corporate income tax revenue (IncTax), indirect
business taxes (IndTax), employment and PPE of foreign a¢liates (EmplRatio and PPE).
Table 4.1: Summary statistics
IncTax IndTax EmplRatio PPE
Mean 454 8149 0.026 8307
Std. Dev. 746 10586 0.015 12187
Observations 968 968 968 968
Cross sections 44 44 44 44
A relationship between ¹ and ¿ can be estimated in a straightforward way with the
following equation
¿it = ®i + ¯¹it + °t + "it (13)
where the indices i and t refer to state and time, respectively, ¿it is the average total tax
rate, ®i is a state speci…c …xed e¤ect, ¹it a measure of foreign ownership and °t captures
time speci…c factors that in‡uences taxation. Because capital mobility is assumed to be
identical across states, changes in it will be picked up by °t. In order to avoid heterogeneity
problems, all variables are estimated in logs.
17Nevertheless, due to this institutional constraints the in‡uence of ¹ on ¿ is likely to be understated in
the regression.
15With our data, equation (13) cannot be sensibly estimated. This is because it turns out
that the estimation results are quite sensitive to the proxy used for pre-tax income (which
is needed to compute the tax rate), such as dividends or commercial income (the sum of
dividends, rental income and interest income). We therefore take a more ‡exible approach
and use tax revenues as the left hand variable and correct for various proxies for income on
the right side (since variables are in logs, adding control variables has a scaling e¤ect on
level tax revenues). Furthermore, we do not have appropriate data for total PPE per state
(foreign plus domestically owned). In order to measure the ownership share from the PPE
of a¢liates, we include absolute PPE of a¢liates as explanatory variable and use di¤erent
income variables to control for total PPE. For the foreign ownership share in employment
(EmplRatio), we can directly use the ratio of employment in a¢liates to total employment.
We thus estimate the following modi…cation of (13)
taxrevit = ®i + ¯¹it + °t + ±tIit + "it (14)
where taxrev is the tax revenue, ¹ either foreign ownership or foreign ownership share and
I a set of income variables.18
4.2 Results and Interpretation
In a …rst step we are interested in whether there is any cross-sectional relation between
foreign ownership and the corporate tax burden. Table 4.2, column 1-4, reports the re-
gression of the total tax revenue (TotTax) on the measures for foreign ownership for 1998,
controlling for income variables.
The …rst two columns in Table 4.2 include the ratio of foreign to total employment
(EmplRatio) as a measure of foreign ownership, the third and fourth column use the PPE
of a¢liates (PPE). In the …rst and third column, dividends (Div) are used to control for
the total income, in the second and fourth column interest income (Int), rental income
(Rent), and labor compensation (Comp) are added. The coe¢cient for foreign ownership
ispositive and signi…cant in all regressions (although signi…cance declineswith the inclusion
of more income variables), thus stateswith higherforeign ownership sharehave alsoa higher
corporate tax burden. This somewhat surprising result may stem from an omitted variable
bias, i.e., a correlation of state-speci…c variables with both foreign ownership and taxes.
We also report time series regressions of (unweighted) state averages over the sample period
(column 5-8). The parameter estimate for foreign ownership is positive and signi…cant in
all regressions except for column 6, where the parameter for EmplRatio is negative and
signi…cant.
18The inclusion of an income variable is important, otherwise a positive parameter for foreign ownership
(¯) in equation (14) could simply stem from higher foreign ownership (in absolute or relative terms) being
correlated with the tax base. Moreover, the income variables act as measures of size and thus controls for
tax competition.
16Table 4.2: Relation between corporate tax burden and foreign ownership
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Const -5.46 -3.67 -4.23 -3.49 0.43 -2.26 1.2 -1.49
(0.02) (0.24) (0.03) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.14)
EmplRatio  5.65  1.14 12.82 -0.44
(0.21) (0.67) (0.49) (0.21)
PPE  0.25  0.08 0.26 0.05
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
Div  0.94  0.08  0.72  0.07 0.54 -0.07 0.36 -0.08
(0.00) (0.03) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Rent  0.23  0.17 -0.01 -0.02
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.005)
Int  0.16  0.18 -0.07 -0.11
(0.03) (0.02) (0.00) (0.01)
Comp  0.51  0.47  1.24  1.22
(0.04) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02)
Unweighted R
2 0.99 0.98 0.97 0.98  0.99  0.996  0.993  0.998
Notes: OLS-estimates, Column (1)-(4): cross-section regression on TotTax (1998), Column (5)-(8): time-series 
regression on U.S-averages of TotTax (1977-1998), t-statistics in parantheses
In order deal with unobserved time and state e¤ects we estimate panel regressions ac-
cording to equation (14). Table 4.3 presents the GLS-estimates. Parameter ¯ is signi…cant
and positive in the regressions using Div as control variable (column 1 and 3) for both
measures of foreign ownership. When more income variables are added (column 2 and 4),
the sign of ¯ reverses.19 The likely reason for the latter is the reverse causality running
from taxation to foreign investment. To address this simultaneity problem, we instrument
the measures of foreign ownership by di¤erent functional forms of state population and
property income. Both instruments can be considered as fairly exogenous with respect to
corporate taxation. They produce high adjusted R2’s in the …rst stage regressions, the
numbers are 0.82 (0.97) and 0.96 (0.999) for EmplRatio and PPE, respectively (weighted
adjusted R2’s are in parentheses).
Table 4.4reportsregressionswith the instrumented foreign ownership variables. Columns
(1)-(4) contain regressions for the total tax burden (TotTax). The coe¢cient for foreign
ownership is now signi…cant and positive in all regressions, i.e., higher foreign ownership
causes higher taxes. Since we partly obtained negative coe¢cients when we measured cor-
relations between foreign ownership and taxes, this also suggests the presence of reverse
causality.20 Columns (5)-(8) of Table 4.4 contain the regression results for corporate income
taxation and indirect business taxes separately. Again, in all regressions the coe¢cient for
foreign ownership is positive and signi…cant. The estimated sensitivity for corporate in-
come taxation (IncTax) with respect to foreign ownership is substantially larger than for
19This indicates the above mentioned sensitivity of the results with respect to the scaling of the tax
revenues.
20For the literature that studies the impact of taxation on the location of capital and pro…ts, this shows
that it is advisable to treat taxes as endogenous.
17the indirect taxes (IndTax) (about 3-4 times). A plausible explanation for that is that cor-
porate income taxes solely relate to corporations and do not cause additional distortions
in the private sector (as sale and property taxes do). Consequently they should be more
sensitive to changes in the foreign ownership.
Table 4.3: The relation between corporate tax burden and
foreign ownership (Panel), 1977-1998
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
EmplRatio 1.47 -0.66
(0.41) (0.25)
PPE  0.05 -0.01
(0.01) (0.01)
Div  0.21 -0.06  0.22 -0.06
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Rent  0.03  0.03
(0.01) (0.01)
Int  0.11  0.10
(0.02) (0.03)
Comp  0.81  0.82
(0.04)  0.04
Unweighted. R
2  0.99  0.995  0.991  0.995
Notes: GLS-estimates, dependent variable is TotTax, White-heteroskedasticity-consistent 
standard errors in parenthesis, fixed and time effects not reported
Table 4.4: E¤ect of foreign ownership on the corporate tax burden, 1977-1998
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
EmplRatio (instr.) 32.48 6.66 23.25 6.72
(1.19) (1.69) (3.947) (1.52)
PPE (instr.)  0.28  0.05  0.19  0.05
(0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01)
Div  0.23 -0.03  0.24 -0.03  0.16  0.16  0.03  0.03
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.05) (0.05) (0.01) (0.01)
Rent  0.02  0.02 -0.10 -0.09 0.02 0.02
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Int  0.10  0.10 0.00 0.00 0.14 0.14
(0.03) (0.02) (0.08) (0.08) (0.03) (0.03)
Comp  0.72  0.74 0.74 0.78 0.71 0.73
(0.03) (0.03) (0.13) (0.12) (0.03) (0.03)
Unweighted R
2  0.994  0.995  0.994  0.995  0.96  0.96  0.995  0.995
Notes: Panel-regression (GLS), dependend variable column (1)-(4): TotTax, column (5)-(6): IncTax, column (7)-(8): IndTax, 
White-heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors in parenthesis, fixed and time effects not reported
We further test for robustness by splitting the sample period in two equal periods. The
coe¢cients for foreign ownership are still positive in both sample periods, although slightly
insigni…cant (at the 10%-level) for the second period from 1988-1998 (not reported). We
test for possible non-stationarity of the residuals by running a pooled unit root test. The
ADF-test …rmly rejects the unit root (but unit root tests are not very informative with
18only 22 years of data). The Durbin-Watson statistic reports …rst order auto correlation.
We therefore include an AR(1) term in our regression (instead of time dummies),21 with
no qualitative changes in our results.
What can be said about the magnitude of the in‡uence of foreign ownership on taxes?
The estimated elasticities from Table 4.3 for the extensive set of income measures (column
2 and 4) are 0:05 for PPE and 6:7 for the share of employment of a¢liates (the latter being
a semi-elasticity). The former number implies that an increase in PPE of foreign a¢liates
by one percentage, everything else being constant, increases corporate taxes by 0:05% (after
controlling for corporate income). An assumed (but realistic) increase in foreign PPE by
100% over the sample period would than have caused an increase in state corporate taxes
by 5%. The foreign employment share has risen by 2:5 percentage points over the sample
period, this implies according to a semi-elasticity of 6:7 a rise in the tax burden by 16:75%
(= 6:7 ¢ 2:5). These numbers are small compared to the drop of average taxes during the
sample period (roughly 50%) but are substantial considering that we are far away from
full diversi…cation (which would imply a share of foreign ownership close to one for a small
country). Assuming a constant elasticity, an increase in the foreign employment share by
15 percentage points would, for example, imply a doubling of the tax burden.22
5 Concluding Remarks
This paper has studied optimal capital taxation under cross-ownership of …rms and capital
in the presence of imperfectly mobile capital. Both our theoretic and empirical analyses
indicate that the tax exporting e¤ect is relatively important (when compared with the
tax competition e¤ect). This is in contrast to the previous literature that has generally
emphasized tax competition. The …ndings are consistent with the current high level of
corporate taxation in the presence of a considerable degree of …nancial integration. Our
analysis moreover suggests that reducing remaining frictions to cross-border capital move-
ments actually leads to an increase in capital taxes, which is diametrical to the common
concern that further …nancial integration undermines the ability of the government to raise
revenues.
There are obvious implications for policy. If the tax exportation e¤ect is dominating
the tax competition e¤ect, capital taxes will be too high and not too low from a global
welfare perspective and tax competition becomes welfare improving. Accordingly, inter-
national tax coordination should then aim at lowering taxes and not at setting minimum
taxes. The analysis also lays open the importance of investors’ beliefs for optimal taxation
21Inclusion of both AR(1)-term and time dummies resulted in near-collinearity of the regressors.
22This number should be taken with some caution because we probably measure the combined e¤ect
of foreign ownership and cross-state ownership. Moreover, elasticities are unlikely to remain constant for
such large changes.
19in a …nancially integrated world. The multiplicity of equilibria that stems from the time-
inconsistency of government actions (the government wishes to announce low tax rates
in order to lure capital into the country but has an incentive to tax capital heavily once
investment has taken place) introduces an additional role for tax coordination: interna-
tional agreements can help to coordinate on favorable equilibria. Governments may also
gain by using commitment devices to reduce the time inconsistency (such as tax holidays).
However, while unilateral policies to reduce time inconsistency can actually improve do-
mestic welfare, they may not be bene…cial on the world level. This is because they allow
governments to compete more e¤ectively for capital, which can lead to a domination of the
tax competition e¤ect and result ine¢ciently low taxes.
20References
[1] Commission of the European Communities. Guidelines on Company Taxation, Com-
mission Communication to Parliament and Council, 1992. 20 April.
[2] Council of the European Union. Primarolo Report, 1999. 23 November, SN 4901/99.
[3] Mihir Desai and James Hines. Foreign direct investment in a world of multiple taxes.
NBER working paper no.8440, 2001.
[4] Michael P. Devereux, Rachel Gri¢th, and Alexander Klemm. Have taxes on mobile
capital declined? mimeo Institute for Fiscal Studies, 2001.
[5] Joeri Gorter and Ashok Parikh. A quantitative study on relationship between foreign
direct investment (FDI) and e¤ective tax rates in the European Union. mimeo CPB
Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis, 2001.
[6] James Hines. Lessons from behavioral responses to international taxation. National
Tax Journal, 52:305–322, 1999.
[7] Harry Huizinga and Soren Bo Nielsen. Capital income and pro…t taxation with foreign
ownership of …rms. Journal of International Economics, 42:149–165, 1997.
[8] Kangoh Lee. Tax competition with imperfectly mobile capital. Journal of Urban
Economics, 42:222–242, 1997.
[9] Assaf Razin and Efraim Sadka. International tax competition and gains from harmo-
nization. Economics Letters, 37:69–76, 1991.
[10] Deborah Swenson. The impact of U.S. tax reform on foreign investment in the United
States. Journal of Public Economics, 54:243–266, 1994.
[11] Vito Tanzi. Is there a need for a world tax organization? In Assaf Razin and
Efrahim Sadka, editors, The Economics of Globalization - Policy Perspectives from
Public Economics, chapter 8. Cambridge University Press, 1999.
[12] Bjoern Volkerink and Jakob de Haan. Tax ratios: A critical survey. mimeo Faculty of
economics, University of Groningen, 1999.
21Appendix
Public good provision for common pro…t and capital income tax. If ¿ applies
to pro…ts and income, then c = (1 ¡¹)[(1¡¿)(f ¡f0k) + (1 ¡¿)f0k] + r(k ¡(1¡¹)k) =
(1¡¹)[(1¡¿)f ¡rk]+rk, g = ¿f, @c=@¿ = (1¡¹)[¡f +(1¡¿)f0k0¡rk0] = ¡(1¡¹)f for
r = (1¡¿)f0 (no-arbitrage condition), @g=@¿ = f+¿f0k0 ) MRS = (1¡¹)f=(f+¿f0k0) =
(1 ¡ ¹)=(1 + ®") (with f = k®).
Conversion between capital and capital income tax. Let ´ the tax rate on
capital returns. Then f0(1 ¡ ´) ¡ ± = r =) ´ = 1 ¡ (r + ±)=f0 (for section 4.2 set ± = 0).
With f0 = r + ¿ + ± the conversion from ¿ to ´ is given by ´ = ¿=(r + ± + ¿).
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